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Abstract
We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential
bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if
revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. While payoffs are higher in English
clock auctions, we find no corresponding difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have
a higher WTP for first-price auctions. Most surprisingly, in both auction formats WTP is higher when there
are more potential bidders, and this difference is not explained by relative payoffs. This result is partially
explained by preferences for competition.
JEL Classifications: D44, D80.
Keywords: auctions, endogenous entry, experiments, bidding.
1 Introduction
Much of the auction literature studies the bidding behavior and revenue ranking of auctions with a fixed
and exogenous set of bidders who do not face entry or participation costs. However, participating in most
auctions is costly. Individuals or firms have an opportunity cost of participating in an auction, and often
also an explicit cost of preparing a bid. These costs might influence the entry decisions of potential bidders.
By neglecting consideration of these costs and the corresponding entry decision, the bulk of the auction
literature has restricted attention to a subgame, while ignoring the effects that endogenous entry may have.
It is well known that when there are independent private values, standard auctions generate the same
predicted expected revenue, holding the number of bidders constant (see e.g. Myerson (1981) and Heyden-
reich et al. (2009)). However, if bidders have preferences over auction mechanisms the number of bidders
attracted by an available auction will, in part, be determined by the auction format. Since expected rev-
enue is increasing in the number of bidders, the auctioneer’s optimal choice of auction mechanism is not
irrelevant, but rather depends crucially on the underlying preferences of potential bidders.
Theorists have informally speculated about the potential ways in which non-pecuniary preferences might
influence bidder willingness to participate in various auction formats. For example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(2001) suggests that oral or ascending auctions may be more attractive for bidders due to lower strategic
uncertainty: Bidders in oral auctions may need or want to spend less effort acquiring and interpreting in-
formation than in sealed-bid auctions. Thus, it costs less to participate in oral auctions than in sealed-bid
auctions. The lower participation cost could make oral auctions more attractive to bidders. Klemperer
(2002) on the other hand argues that ascending auctions are vulnerable to predatory behavior on the part of
bidders, which might depress entry when there are even small participation costs.
This paper experimentally examines endogenous entry thresholds in independent private value auctions
in which there is a cost of participation that is common to all potential bidders, and each bidder knows
her value prior to her entry decision. We vary auction format between first-price and English clock on a
between-subject basis, and vary the size of the pool of potential bidders on a within-subject basis.
We employ the Becker deGroot Marschak (BDM) procedure to elicit threshold entry decisions (i.e.
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate in the auction). More precisely, in each auction, potential
bidders are privately informed of their value, and then simultaneously report their maximum WTP to enter
the auction, without knowing what the participation cost of the auction is. This common participation cost,
which is randomly chosen, is then revealed to them. Those who reported a maximum WTP that (weakly)
exceeds the chosen participation cost enter the auction and observe the number of bidders who entered
before placing their bids.1 Given the complexity of using a BDM mechanism to determine participation in
an auction, we relied on subjects who had previously participated in an experiment that involved directly
choosing to enter or not into an auction (see Aycinena and Rentschler (2014)).
We find that WTP for both auction formats is increasing in their private value. We also find that reported
WTP systematically exceeds equilibrium predictions and payoffs in both auction formats. This difference
exists both when there are three and five potential bidders and is consistent with other experiments on entry
(Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Fischbacher and Thoni (2008)).
We also find that men are willing to pay more to enter a first-price auction, and that, in both auction
formats, potential bidders are willing to pay more to enter an auction when there are five potential bidders,
than when there are only three potential bidders. This last puzzling result is despite that fact that predicted
and observed payoffs decrease when the number of potential bidders increases. This result is partially
explained by competitiveness: more competitive potential bidders report a higher WTP for auctions with
five potential bidders, all else constant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
1Those who do not enter play tic-tac-toe against a computer in order to mitigate boredom.
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provides theoretical predictions. Section 4 describes our experimental design. Section 5 contains results.
Section 6 discusses the implications of our results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Early theoretical analysis of endogenous entry has focused on cases where potential bidders observe the
common cost of participation, and then decide whether or not to enter. Only after entry do bidders learn
their valuation of the good. At this stage bidders also observe the number of bidders who entered the auction.
McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith (1994) both take this approach for ex ante homogenous and
risk neutral bidders in an independent private values framework. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) examines a
more general environment in which bidder’s valuations may be interdependent, but maintains the assumption
that bidders only observe their signal upon entering the auction. Smith and Levin (1996) examines the
independent private values environment for the case of ex ante homogenous risk averse bidders.
Pevnitskaya (2004) generalizes this approach by allowing for heterogeneous levels of risk aversion,
where an individual’s degree of risk aversion is private information. As such, bidders hold private informa-
tion when making entry decisions, and bidders with a degree of risk aversion above some threshold enter the
auction. Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2008) reports the result of an experiment which demonstrates that bidders
with relatively high degrees of risk aversion do self select into a first-price auction.
In a related approach, Li and Zheng (2009) studies procurement auction in which bidders only learn
their private cost of supplying the good upon entering, but do not observe the number of actual bidders. This
paper then tests the model using data from highway mowing auctions in Texas.
Moreno and Wooders (2011) also examines the case in which bidders learn their private value only after
incurring participation costs, but these participation costs are private information and are independently
drawn from a common distribution. It is shown that in this environment, a seller wishing to maximize
revenue will screen bidders by either their value or their entry cost.
Ye (2004) examines independent private value auctions in which bidders only learn their value after
incurring the cost of participation, but allows bidders to also observe signals which provide information
about the other bidders’ valuations.
The theoretical literature that is more closely related to our design changes the timing of information
revelation in the game slightly. In particular, bidders observe the same commonly known entry cost of
participation and their independent private valuation of the good prior to deciding whether or not to enter
the auction. As such, their entry decision is contingent on their valuation. Menezes and Monteiro (2000)
was, to the best of our knowledge,the first to examine symmetric equilibrium for risk neutral bidders in
several auction formats in this environment. Lu (2009) examines optimal auction design when bidders
observe their valuations prior to their entry decision, and all bidders have the same opportunity cost of entry.
Much of the attention in this literature has focused on second price auctions, as bidders who enter have
a weakly dominant strategy to bid their valuation. Campbell (1998) identifies conditions on the distribution
of values which guarantees the existence of asymmetric equilibrium in second price auctions when the
participation cost is the same for all potential bidders. Tan and Yilankaya (2006) also examines second price
auctions in this environment but allows for asymmetric bidders. Miralles (2008) generalizes the results of
Tan and Yilankaya (2006). Cao and Tian (2008) generalizes these results by allowing heterogeneous but
commonly known participation costs.
Cao and Tian (2010) analyzes the case of homogenous and common knowledge participation costs in the
context of independent private value first price auctions, and finds conditions on the distribution of values
which guarantee the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium, in addition to symmetric equilibrium.
The case in which both bidders valuations and participation costs are both private information has also
been studied. Green and Laffont (1984) and Cao and Tian (2009) both investigate this case in second price
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auctions.
Despite the important theoretical progress, that has been relatively little empirical or experimental work
on entry in auctions. The existing literature largely focuses attention on the case in which bidders only learn
their value after they have incurred in their participation cost.
Smith and Levin (2002) experimentally examines the entry decisions of bidders in which the subsequent
auction was simulated and the payoff of a bidder that choose to enter the auction was the expected equilib-
rium payoff. This is akin to examining the case in which bidders learn their value after entry had occurred.
They find support for the equilibrium in which bidders mix between entering or not entering, rather than the
equilibrium in which bidders employ pure entry decisions.
Reiley (2005) reports the results of a field experiment in which the reserve price for online sealed-bid
auctions for collectible trading cards was varied. He also finds support for the prediction that bidders employ
a mixed strategy entry decision. Furthermore, he finds that a reserve price of zero yields more revenue that
a reserve price equal to the seller’s valuation, contrary to theory.
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) examines bidder preferences between ascending bid auctions and
first-price auctions. Bidders were asked to choose between these two formats every period. In some periods
the participation cost was equalized between the two formats, while in others it differed between formats.
They find strong preferences for the ascending bid auction, although bidders were not willing to incur a
participation cost for ascending bid auctions sufficient to equalize profits between the two formats.
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008b) examines the ability of two hypotheses to explain the low will-
ingness to pay for ascending bid auctions. In particular, they examine entry in auctions in which entry is
endogenous, but the losing bidders do not pay a participation cost and the winning bidder incurs a “surplus
tax” to test the hypothesis that loss aversion may play a role. They also use a second-price sealed-bid auction
in place of the ascending bid auction to test the hypothesis that bidders may become impatient for the as-
cending auction to end. They find that neither of these hypotheses can explain the results of Ivanova-Stenzel
and Salmon (2004).
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008a) experimentally examine the question of whether first-price auc-
tions of ascending bid auctions will generate more revenue, given that bidders in Ivanova-Stenzel and
Salmon (2004) and Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008b) demonstrate a preference for ascending clock auc-
tions.That is, the two auction formats compete for the same set of potential bidders. They find that bidder
preferences for ascending bid auctions restores revenue equivalence between these formats, in contrast to
the higher revenue for first-price auctions typically observed when the number of bidders is fixed (see e.g.
Kagel and Levin (1993)).
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2005) report the result of a similar experiment but find that, while
bidders seem to prefer the ascending bid auction, the increased number of bidders in the ascending bid auc-
tion is not sufficient to drive observed revenue above that of the first-price auction, due to the overbidding
in first-price auctions. In what is the closest experimental design to that of this paper, they also report the
result of experiments in which potential bidders must choose between participating in either an ascending
bid auction or a first-price auction and an outside option. They elicit this choice for a range of possible out-
side options using a Becker deGroot Marschak (BDM) mechanism. They found no statistically significant
difference in the willingness to pay for these these two auction formats, despite the fact that bidders earn
significantly more in the ascending auction. Their design differs from ours in several important ways. First,
bidders in this experiment did not observe their value until after entry had occurred. That is, entry decisions
were not able to be conditioned on bidder valuations. Second, in their design, auction format was varied on
a within-subject basis, whereas we vary this between subjects.2
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2011) reports experimental results of a design extremely close to that
2Aycinena and Renstchler (2013) uses within-subject variation on auction formats to examine bidding behavior in auctions with
endogenous entry.
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of Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008a) with one crucial difference: the bidder observes her value before
making her entry decision. They find that bidders with low valuations are likely to choose the first-price
auction, while bidders with high valuation are likely to choose the ascending clock auction. They also find
that revenue and efficiency are equal between the two formats. However, bidder payoffs are higher in the
ascending bid auctions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only other experimental examination of
endogenous participation in independent private value auctions in which the bidder observes his value before
making an entry decision. Our design differs from theirs in that, rather than being asked to choose between
auction formats with a given value, bidders choose whether to participate or not in a given auction format
by expressing their willingness to pay the participation cost. Interestingly, we do not find any difference in
willingness to pay between the two formats for low or high values.
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2011) finds that bidders with low valuations self select into first-price
auctions and that bidders with high valuations self select into English clock auctions in an environment in
which there is no cost of participation for either format. Rather, the bidder must choose which of these
two formats to enter. This means that bidders with lower values have a relative preference for first-price
auctions and bidders with higher values have a relative preference for English clock, a phenomenon that
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2011) dubs the high/low divide. However, we find that when a bidder has a
lower value, or has a higher value, there is no difference in willingness to pay between the two formats. This
may be because bidders in our design don’t have to participate in an auction and choose the format. Instead
they choose whether to incurr a cost and participate in an auction or not. That is, when a bidder’s choice set
includes the possibility of not participating an an auction at all, we find no evidence for the high/low divide.
3 Theory
A set of risk neutral players N ≡ {1, ..., n} are potential bidders in an auction for a single unit of an
indivisible good. Each potential bidder i ∈ N privately observes her value of the good vi, which is an
independent draw of V , with distribution F and support [0, vH ]. The seller is presumed to have value of
zero. There is a cost of participating in the auction, c ∈ [0, vH ], which is common to all potential bidders.
This cost, n and F are common knowledge. Upon entering the auction, all bidders are informed of the
number of entrants, m, prior to choosing their bids.
In the unique symmetric equilibrium, potential bidders enter the auction only if their value weakly
exceeds a threshold value, which we denote as vc, for which they are indifferent regarding entry. Since
equilibrium bid functions in the subsequent auction are monotonically increasing, a bidder with vi = vc
can only win the auction if she is the only entrant, which occurs with probability F (vc)
n−1. In this case
she obtains the good at a price of zero. Thus, the expected payoff of entering the auction with vi = vc is
vcF (vc)
n−1, and vc must satisfy
vcF (vc)
n−1 = c. (1)
Notice that vc does not vary by standard auction format. Since, in equilibrium, each bidder employs the
same cutoff entry strategy, any bidder who has entered must have a valuation above vc. Thus, the subsequent
auction is a standard independent private value auction withm bidders in which each valuation is drawn from
F (v | v ≥ vc) = F (vi)− F (vc)
1− F (vc) . (2)
In an English clock auction, bidders have a weakly dominant strategy to bid their value. As such, their
equilibrium bid function is ρ (vi) = vi.3 In a first-price auction (following Menezes and Monteiro (2000))
3Derivations of equilibrium can be found in Appendix A.
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the equilibrium bid function is
β (vi) = vi −
(
1
(F (vi)− F (vc))m−1
)∫ vi
vc
(F (t)− F (vc))m−1 dt. (3)
Menezes and Monteiro (2000) finds that first-price and English clock auctions in this environment are
revenue equivalent. This expected revenue, R, is given by
R = n (n− 1)
∫ vH
vc
(1− F (t)) tF (t)n−2 f (t) dt. (4)
That is, theory predicts that the revenue equivalence theorem generalizes to environments with endogenous
entry.
4 Experimental design
We employ a 2× 2 design that varies the number of potential bidders in a group within subjects, and varies
the auction format between subjects. In particular, in some sessions, the auction format is first-price, and in
others it is English clock. Within a given session we alternate the number of potential bidders in a period
between three and five in ten period blocks. In order to control for order effects, we vary the order in which
subjects face these alternative group sizes. For each auction format, we ran a total of five sessions.
An experimental session has fifteen participants and forty periods. In each period participants are ran-
domly and anonymously matched into groups. Each group comprises a set of potential bidders for an
auction. Values in each auction are independent draws from a uniform distribution on {0, ..., 100}. At the
beginning of each period, potential bidder i observes her value (vi) for that period, which is private infor-
mation. The auction format for that period and the number of potential bidders are common knowledge.
Likewise, each bidder knows that if she enters the auction she will be informed of the number of entrants
(m) prior to choosing her bid.
In each period there is a common cost of entering the auction which is drawn from a discrete uniform
distribution on {1, ..., 30}, and is not initially observed by potential bidders. The cost of entry was restricted
in order to reduce the number of auctions in which the cost of entry was so costly as to preclude any entry.
In the first stage of a period, each potential bidder reports her WTP to enter the auction. Afterwards, all
potential bidders are informed of the entry cost. If a potential bidder’s WTP is at least as large as the entry
cost, then she enters the auction, is informed of the number of entrants, and chooses her bid. Otherwise
she does not enter the auction.4 Reported WTP is restricted to be between zero and thirty-one. We opted
to allow reported WTP to be either strictly smaller or strictly larger than the possible costs of entry so that
participants would have an obvious way to indicate that they would like to enter or not regardless of the
realized cost of entry.
This entry mechanism is an asset to our design because it allows us to obtain a much more precise
measure of WTP than if potential bidders were simply asked to enter or not after observing their value and
the entry cost.5 However, participants may have a difficult time assessing these expected payoffs, since
auctions are a complex environment. Indeed, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2005) hypothesize that this
4That is, the Becker DeGroot Marschak (BDM) procedure is used to elicit WTP (Becker et al. (1964)), so that each participant
has an incentive to report her true WTP. To see that this entry procedure is consistent with the theory described above, note that
any vi is equal to an equilibrium entry threshold for some c. Since vc is increasing in c, and expected payoffs for a given c are
increasing in vi, potential bidders have an incentive to report the c for which their observed value is the entry threshold as their
WTP.
5Alternatively, we could have elicited the minimum value they required to participate given the cost of entry. We choose to elicit
WTP because such assessments are more likely to coincide with decisions faced by participants outside the lab.
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drives their results in a similar experiment. Participants may also have a difficult time understanding that
they maximize their utility by being truthful in the WTP elicitation.
Our design addresses both these concerns directly. To ensure that inexperience in auction environments
does not bias our data, we restricted to participants with previous experience in another experiment (reported
in Aycinena and Rentschler (2014)) involving costly entry in auctions.6 To ensure understanding of the entry
procedure in the current experiment, we carefully explained the procedure in the instructions, and provided
examples which illustrated why being truthful was the optimal choice and why deviating from truthful
revelation was weakly dominated. Further, we tested understanding of the entry procedure prior to the
experiment.7
If a potential bidder does not enter the auction that period, she participates in a pastime while she waits
for the auction to end. This pastime does not affect payoffs and is intended to mitigate boredom from
inducing participants to report WTP in excess of their financial incentives. However, we also do not want
the pastime to be so engaging as to reduce WTP. To this end, the pastime involves participants playing tic-
tac-toe against a computer. Note that the pastime as well as the use of the BDM mechanism are consistent
across both auction format and the number of potential bidders, so any treatment differences are not driven
by the choice of pastime or elicitation mechanism on WTP.
Once the auction for that period has ended, each participant, regardless of whether or not they partici-
pated in the auction receives feedback. They are informed of the cost of entry, the number of bidders, the
price at which the good was obtained (when applicable), all observed bids (ordered from highest to lowest),
as well as their payoff for the period.
All sessions were run at the Centro Vernon Smith Economı´a Experimental at Universidad Francisco
Marroquı´n. Subjects were undergraduates of said institution. The computer interface was programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Subjects were seated at computer terminals for the duration of the experiment.
These terminals have dividers to prevent subjects from interacting outside of the computer interface. Once
seated, subjects were shown video instructions (they were also provided with a hard copy of the instruc-
tions).8 This video contains screen shots of the computer interface in order to familiarize subjects with
the environment. Once the video was completed, subjects were asked to complete a short quiz to ensure
comprehension. Any remaining questions were then answered in private.
Each session lasted for approximately one and a half hours. Subjects were paid a Q20 ≈ US$2.50
show-up fee. All other monetary amounts in the experiment were denominated in experimental pesos (E$),
which were exchanged for Quetzales at a rate of E$7.5 = Q1. Subjects began the experiment with a
starting balance of five hundred experimental pesos to cover any losses. The average payoff was Q84, with
a minimum of Q36 and a maximum of Q147.
5 Results
5.1 Willingness to pay
Assuming equilibrium beliefs, a potential bidder?s WTP is predicted to correspond to the entry cost at which
she is indifferent between participating or not. That is, WTP is predicted to satisfy WTP = vi · F (vi)n−1.
6In this previous experiment, there were forty-eight periods of auctions with endogenous entry. Potential bidders observed their
values and the cost of entry, and then made a binary entry decision. Half of these forty-eight auctions were first-price and the other
half were English clock.In this previous experiment we also elicited risk preferences using a procedure similar to that of Holt and
Laury (2002), with the exception that participants choose between a certain payment and a lottery in each of the ten decisions. This
was done to mimic the auction environment, in which the payoff of not entering the auction is certain.
7In addition, after each entry decision the screen displayed what would happen if the participation cost were weakly less than
their stated WTP as well as what would happen if it was strictly greater, and asked them to confirm (or modify) their decision.
8Instructions for first-price auctions and the risk preferences elicitation, translated from the original Spanish, are in Appendix B
and C, respectively.
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For the parameters used, this is WTP = vni /100
n−1, which ranges from zero to one hundred. However,
we restrict reported WTP to fall between zero and thirty-one. Since the entry cost can never be smaller than
one, potential bidders with a value such that 1 > vni /100
n−1 are predicted to report a WTP strictly less than
one and never enter the auction. Likewise, since the entry cost cannot exceed thirty, potential bidders with
a value such that 30 < vni /100
n−1 are predicted to report a WTP (weakly) greater than thirty, and always
enter the auction.
We refer to the interval of values for which a potential bidder is never predicted to enter as region one.
The interval of values for which predicted entry depends on the realized entry cost is referred to as region
two, and the interval of values such that entry is always predicted is referred to as region three. When the
number of potential bidders is three (five), region one consists of values strictly smaller than 22(40), region
two is 22 ≤ vi ≤ 66 (40 ≤ vi ≤ 78), and region three consists of values strictly above 66(78). We focus
our analysis on region two, where the entry decision is not predicted to be trivial.9
Theory predicts WTP to be an increasing function of value and that is precisely what we find: reported
WTP is increasing in potential bidders’ valuation. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 2, which shows mean
reported and predicted WTP by valuation, group size and auction format.
However, revealed WTP exceeds predictions, regardless of auction format or group size.10 This result is
further detailed in Table 1, which reports summary statistics for predicted and revealed WTP across auction
format and group size. Since reporting WTP in excess of theoretical predictions results in over-entry in
expectation, we will refer to this phenomenon as over-entry. Conversely, we refer to WTP below predictions
as under-entry.
To further investigate how reported WTP compares with Nash predictions we use random effect tobits
to control for individual subject effects, and to account for the fact that reported WTP is censored. The
dependent variable, WTPit, is potential bidder i’s reported WTP in period t. To determine whether or not
reported WTP conforms to theory when controlling for additional factors, we include bidder i’s predicted
WTP during period t (PWTPit).11 Note that PWTPit is a function of both value and group size on region
two (PWTPit = vit/cdotF (vit)
n−1), so the inclusion of this variable tests whether or notWTPit responds
to changes in value and group size as predicted by theory. We are also interested in treatment effects. To
test whether auction format or group size has a level effect on reported WTP we include dummy variables
FPi and G5it that indicate whether the auction format is first-price and group size was five, respectively. We
also interact these treatment dummies with with PWTPit. If entry behavior is consistent with theory, then
the coefficient on PWTPit will equal one, and the remaining coefficients will not differ from zero.
In addition, we report specificatations which include additional controls. Specifically, we control for
gender (Malei = 1 if participant i is male), age (Agei), learning over the course of the experiment (ln(t+
1)), an interaction of gender and the first-price auction dummy, and a dummy variable which controls for
order effects (GroupOrderi = 1 if participant i began the experiment with a group size of five).12
Table 2 contains estimates for region two.13 The first two specifications present results for all periods,
both with and without the additional controls, and the last two specifications restrict attention to the second
half of the experiment (last twenty periods) as a robustness check.
We find that reported WTP is increasing in predicted WTP, but this responsiveness is less than is pre-
9Recall that although the maximum possible entry cost is thirty, we allow potential bidders to report WTP greater than thirty
so that there is a transparent way to enter the auction regardless of the realized entry cost. In our analysis we censor all such
observations to thirty. Likewise, predicted WTP in excess of thirty is also censored at thirty in our analysis.
10A sign test using session level data to ensure independence of observations yields the same result in all four treatments: w = 5,
p = 0.031. It is important to note that subjects had previously participated in an experiment with endogenous entry in both of these
auction formats, so inexperience regarding relative payoffs is unlikely to drive this result.
11Both WTPit and PWTPit are censored on the range [0, 30].
12Recall that group size variation is either n = 5 or n = 3 for the first ten periods and then switches back and forth in ten period
blocks.
13Appendix E contains Table 9, which presents the results when we pool the data across all regions.
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dicted by theory. To see this, note that in all specifications the coefficient corresponding to PWTPit is
positive and significant, but is also significantly less than one.14 In addition, the coefficient corresponding
to the constant is positive and statistically significant, suggesting a level effect of overentry.
There also seems to be learning throughout the experiment, which moves reported WTP closer to theo-
retical predictions. To see this, note that when we restrict to the second half of the experiment the sensitivity
of WTPit to PWTPit is higher, and the constant is lower, then when using the full sample. This is true
even when controlling for ln(t+ 1), which is negative and statistically significant.
An important finding is that, as predicted by theory, entry behavior is invariant across auction formats. In
particular, the coefficient for FPi is not significantly different than zero in any specification. Furthermore,
the sensitivity ofWTPit to predictions does not vary by auction format, since the coefficients corresponding
to the interaction between PWTPit and FPi is not statistically different from zero. This entry threshold
invariance across auction format is of interest because Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) finds that, in an
environment, where bidders do not observe their value before making their entry decision, bidders have a
higher WTP for English clock auctions.15 Our results resemble those of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2005), which finds no difference in WTP between first-price and English clock auctions in an environment
where bidders only observe their value after they enter the auction. As mentioned above, participants in
our experiment observe their value prior to entry and have previous experience in an experiment involving
endogenous entry in auctions in which the auction format was varied (between first-price and English clock)
on a within subject basis.
However, entry by auction format is heterogeneous across gender: males report higher WTP for first-
price auctions. In particular, although the coefficient on Malei is not significant, the interaction of Malei
with FPi is both positive and significant (marginally in the second half). This result is illustrated in Figure
3, which compares WTP across treatments and gender in region two.16 This suggests that males prefer first-
price auctions to English clock auctions, and that this preference is not shared by females. In fact, Figure 3
suggests that this preference ordering may be reversed for females, although the difference is not significant
at conventional levels.
Our most surprising result is that reported WTP is increasing in group size. To see this, note that
the coefficient for G5it is highly significant and positive in all specifications. Further, the magnitude of these
coefficients increases when attention is restricted to the second half. Note that this is a level effect; sensitivity
of WTPit to PWTPit is not affected by group size, as the coefficients corresponding to the interaction
between PWTPit and G5it group size is not significant in any specification. This puzzling result is not due
to differences in payoffs (see below). However, such behavior is not unique to our experiment. For example,
Fischbacher and Thoni (2008) reports similar results in winner-take-all experimental markets. They study
winner-take-all markets with groups of seven or eleven potential participants, who face an opportunity cost
of entering the market. The expected prize decreases with number of entrants. They report excess entry
relative to Nash equilibrium, and the excess entry increases with group size.
5.2 Payoffs
Given the two-stage nature of the game, it is possible that deviations from theoretical entry predictions in the
first stage stem from expected non-equilibrium bidding behavior in the auction. Since (beliefs about) bidding
behavior should only affect entry decisions through (beliefs about) payoffs, we relegate a detailed analysis
14The p-values for tests of coefficients are reported below the relevant specification.
15Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008b) and Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2011) both find that bidder will often choose English
clock auctions over first-price auctions when bidders do not know their valuation prior to entry. Since all else is equal between the
two formats in their design, it is not possible to determine if this choice represents a higher WTP.
16Appendix E contains Figure 4 which includes data from all regions.
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of bidding behavior to Appendix D and focus here on auction payoffs.17 We consider bidder payoffs in the
terminal subgame, without accounting for the incurred participation cost, as this is the relevant comparison
to WTP.
Table 3 contains summary statistics regarding observed and predicted bidder payoffs, as well as observed
WTP for region two.18 Figure 5 illustrates the same.19 Observed payoffs in the auction exceed ex-ante
predicted payoffs in all treatments. This is driven by selection; those who enter the auction have higher
values. When we condition predicted payoffs on the observed number of entrants we find that bidders earn
less than predicted.20
Importantly, note that observed WTP of bidders considerably exceeds their observed payoffs in all treat-
ments, and therefore cannot explain overentry.21 Not only are participants over-entering with respect to
theory, but with respect to realized payoffs as well. Such overentry relative to payoffs has been documented
in other experiments on entry such as Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2008); Fischbacher and Thoni (2008).
Assuming that potential bidders have higher WTP for environments in which their payoffs are higher, we
would expect to find that payoffs are equal across auction formats, and that payoffs are higher when group
size is five. However, in both cases we find the opposite. Payoffs are greater in English clock auctions,
although the magnitude of this difference is small and not very robust.22 Further, payoffs are greater for
groups of three than groups of five.23 The latter result implies that relative payoffs between the two group
sizes is unable to explain the higher WTP when group size is five.
Turning attention to gender differences, since males report a higher WTP for first-price auctions, one
might expect that their payoffs are higher in the same. However, payoffs for males are actually lower in first-
price auctions, although this difference is not significant (sign test, w = 9, p < 0.623). As such, relative
payoffs are also unable to explain the male preference for first-price auctions. Further, while males do earn
more than females in first-price auctions this difference is not statistically significant (sign test, w = 5,
p < 0.187). This result also holds for the pooled sample (sign test, w = 7, p < 0.172).
6 Discussion
To recap our results, we find that WTP is increasing in value, although it is less responsive than the risk-
neutral Nash prediction. However, there is a positive level effect such that we observe consistent overentry.
This level effect is increasing in group size, and this preference for a higher group size cannot be explained
by relative payoffs. Both expected and observed payoffs are decreasing in group size.
In addition, we find that, consistent with theoretical predictions, entry threshold strategies are invariant
to auction format. That is, reported WTP does not, on average, vary across auction formats. However, we
find that males express a preference (revealed by higher WTP) for first price auctions relative to English
17Our results regarding reported WTP are likely to be driven by expected payoffs in the subsequent auction. This is particularly
true since potential bidders have experience in a similar experiment, and are thus likely to have an easier time forming accurate
beliefs about relative payoffs than inexperienced participants. This point is particularly important since Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2005) argues that experimental participants have a difficult time determining expected payoffs in a given auction format.
18Notice that in contrast to regions one and three, WTP in region two is not truncated and so may be directly compared with
payoffs.
19Figure 6 in Appendix E illustrates payoffs in all three regions.
20This holds true for the pooled data (sign test, w = 10, p = 0.001), as well as analyzing by auction format, group size or
auction format and group size (all of these tests yield the same results: sign test, w = 5, p = 0.031).
21This holds true for the pooled data (sign test, w = 10, p = 0.001), as well as analyzing by auction format, group size or
auction format and group size (all of these tests yield the same results: sign test, w = 5, p = 0.031).
22Using the robust rank order test, U´ = −1.768, p < 0.038. The difference is not statistically significant when restricting to
either group size.
23For the pooled data: sign test, w = 9, p = 0.011. The same result holds when considering each auction format separately:
sign test, w = 5, p = 0.031.
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clock. This cannot be explained by greater male profits in first price auctions.
In the following subsections we discuss and evaluate hypothesis that may explain our results.
6.1 WTP and competitiveness
The literature on auctions has explored the hypothesis that a joy of winning may explain why observed
bidding (particularly in first and second-price auctions) exceeds Nash predictions (see e.g. Cox et al. (1988),
Cox et al. (1992), Cooper and Fang (2008)). A variant of this hypothesis in which the joy of winning is
increasing in the number of people in the auction (or other competitive environment) could explain why we
observe that WTP is increasing in group size.
The literature on auctions has explored the hypothesis that a joy of winning may explain why observed
bidding (particularly in first and second-price auctions) exceeds Nash predictions (see e.g. Cox et al. (1988),
Cox et al. (1992), Cooper and Fang (2008)). It is reasonable to suppose that such a joy of winning is higher
for more competitive individuals, and that it is increasing in the number of competitors. If so, we would
expect to see higher WTP for more competitive potential bidders, and a higher WTP for larger group sizes
among such individuals.
To test these two hypotheses, we examine a subset of our sample (83.2%) for which we have data on
preferences for competition from a different experiment. This measure is the weight that a participant places
on a tournament payment scheme rather then a piece-rate payment scheme when the tournament is between
four subjects over a real effort task. Using this subset of the data, we estimate random effects tobits similar
to those reported in Table 2, and include controls for competitiveness (Compi).
Table 7 presents the results. The first specification tests the robustness of the results reported in Table
2) for the sub-sample with competitiveness data. Although coefficient magnitudes change slightly, all coef-
ficients have the same sign and statistical significance expect for the coefficient corresponding to ln(t + 1)
which, although still negative, it is no longer statistically significant.
Turning attention to specifications including Compi, we find that competitiveness partially explains
why WTP is increasing in group size, but find no support for the hypothesis that more competitive potential
bidders will have higher WTP overall. To see this, note that when we only add Compi (specification two)
we find that it has no significant effect on WTPit. However, when we add an interaction between Compi
and G5it (specification three), the corresponding coefficient is positive and highly significant. Further, when
we include this interaction the coefficient on G5it, although still positive and significant, drops in magnitude
by about a third.
6.2 WTP and male preference for first-price auctions
There are several hypothesis could explain why males have higher WTP to participate in first-price auctions
than in English clock auctions. One possibility is that this difference may be driven by a relative male pref-
erence for competition, provided first-price auctions are perceived as being more competitive than English
clock auctions.24 A second possibility is that this could be driven by differences in risk attitudes across
gender. Specifically this difference could be due to men being less risk averse than women.25 Finally, the
higher WTP for first-price auctions for men could also be due to the fact that first-price auctions have higher
strategic uncertainty than English clock auctions, in the sense that English clock auctions have a weakly
dominant bidding strategy, while first-price auctions do not. If men prefer environments where there is more
strategic uncertainty, then they will tend to have higher WTP in first-price auctions.
We do not find support for the hypothesis that a gender difference in competitiveness drives the higher
WTP for first-price auctions among males. Recall that the coefficient for Compi is not statistically signifi-
24Such a gender difference in preferences for competition has been shown in e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
25See Eckel and Grossman (2008) for a meta-analysis of this literature.
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cant in specification (2) of Table 7, and controlling for it does not reduce the coefficient on the interaction
between FPi and Malei. Furthermore, in specification (4) of the same table we control for the interaction
of Compi with both auction formats and find no effect of competitiveness on WTP in first-price auctions.26
As such, we conclude that our measure of competitiveness does not explain why men are willing to pay
more to participate in a first-price auction.
To investigate the possibility that gender differences in risk preferences explains why men have higher
WTP for first-price auctions, we examine a subsample of our data (89.7%) for whom we have elicited risk
preferences in an earlier experiment.27 In particular, control for risk preferences (SafeChoicesi equal to
the number of safe choices participant i choose in the risk elicitation task) in tobit regressions on WTP, and
report results in Table 8.
The first specification confirms the robustness of results without risk preferences for the relevant subsam-
ple; the magnitude of coefficients and corresponding statistical significance are very similar. In the second
specification we include SafeChoicesi and find that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that risk aversion is associated with lower WTP. However, controlling for SafeChoicesi has
no effect on male preferences for first price auctions. The final specification interacts SafeChoicesi with
auction format. For both first-price and English clock auctions, this interaction is negative and statistically
significant. However, we cannot reject that the corresponding coefficients are the same (p = 0.923) and the
coefficient that captures male preference for first price auction is robust to these controls. Thus, we conclude
that risk preferences are unable to explain the observed male preference for first-price auctions.
Our final hypothesis is that the higher WTP for first-price auctions for men could also be due to the fact
that first-price auctions have higher strategic uncertainty than English clock auctions. If, all else constant,
men prefer environments with strategic uncertainty, perhaps due to greater overconfidence (see e.g. Barber
and Odean (2001), Johnson et al. (2006), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)), then this could explain their
higher WTP for first-price auctions. In particular, since English clock auctions have a weakly dominant
bidding strategy, there is little to no strategic uncertainty. The same would be true of first-price auctions
if bidders behave as predicted (and this is common knowledge). However, in first-price auctions bidders
must determine how much to shade their bid and this depends on their beliefs about what others will do.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2001) identifies this asymmetry in strategic uncertainty, but implicitly assumes it to
be homogenous across genders and argues the increased strategic complexity in first-price auctions relative
to English clock auctions may drive bidder preferences for English clock auctions. Our findings suggest the
opposite might be true for males. Further research is needed to investigate this hypothesis.
7 Conclusion
We experimentally examine threshold entry decisions in independent private value auctions where partici-
pation is costly and bidders learn their value before they make their entry decisions. In particular, we elicit
WTP using an incentive compatible BDM mechanism. Once each bidder has reported her WTP, a partici-
pation cost that is common to all potential bidders is drawn from a uniform distribution. If reported WTP
(weakly) exceeds this participation cost then the bidder incurs this cost and enters the auction. Bidders are
then told how many bidders there are in the auction and then place their bids.
26We further test whether there is a gender difference in competition for subjects randomly assigned to first-price auction treat-
ment and find only weak evidence for gender difference (robust rank order test, U´ = 1.384, p = 0.083). We do not find any
difference in competitiveness between males assigned to the first-price auction and the English clock auction treatments (Robust
rank order test, U´ = 0.423, p > 0.10).
27This data was collected in the experiment reported in Aycinena and Rentschler (2014). This measure of risk is similar to Holt
and Laury (2002) except that the safe lottery in each row is replaced by a certain outcome. Thus, each row features a task that is
similar to the entry choice of a potential bidder, in which entry is a lottery, and not entering yields a certain payoff.
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We vary the auction format between a first-price auction and an English clock auction on a between-
subject basis. In addition we vary the size of the pool of potential bidders between three and five, on a
within-subject basis.
In accordance with theory, we find that WTP is increasing in bidder valuation. For the region of values
where theory predicts that the entry decision will depend on the realization of the entry cost, we find that
WTP increases in value at about 2/3 of what theory predicts. However, there is a level increase in reported
WTP regardless of value, which results in, on average, higher than predicted WTP.
When bidders report WTP in excess of predicted WTP, we say that they are over-entering the auction,
because, on average, they will enter the auction more than predicted by theory. The observed over-entry
exists in both auction formats, and persists throughout the experiment. This is despite that fact that they are
paying more to enter the auction than they earn, on average.
Our most surprising result is that potential bidders have a higher WTP for auctions with a group size
of five, than for auctions with a group size of three. This is despite the fact that observed and predicted
payoffs are both decreasing in the number of potential bidders. We argue that this result is consistent with
a preference for larger competitive environments and show that competitiveness can partially explain this
result.
Interestingly, we also find that reported WTP for males is higher for first-price auctions than for English
clock auctions. This is interesting because Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004, 2008b, 2011) all find that
bidders seem to prefer English clock auctions, although their experimental design is markedly different than
ours. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2005), which has a design much closer to ours (although bidders
only learn their value after entry) does not find any difference in WTP across these two auction formats.
This result is not explained by risk preferences or competitiveness (although both of these seem to play
a role in reported WTP. (As expected, we also find that measures of risk aversion reduce observed WTP
and measures of competitiveness increase WTP.) We speculate this might due to men, controlling for risk
preferences, preferring environments where there is higher strategic uncertainty. Further research should
help to shed light on this finding.
References
D. Aycinena and L. Rentschler. Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders:
Experimental evidence. Working paper, 2014.
Brad M Barber and Terrance Odean. Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock
investment. Quarterly journal of Economics, pages 261–292, 2001.
G. Becker, M. DeGroot, and J. Marschak. Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method. Be-
havioral science, 9(3):226–232, 1964.
C. Camerer and D. Lovallo. Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental approach. American
Economic Review, 89(1):306–318, 1999.
C. Campbell. Coordination in auctions with entry. Journal of Economic Theory, 82(2):425–450, 1998.
X. Cao and G. Tian. Second-price auctions with differentiated participation costs. Working paper, 2008.
X. Cao and G. Tian. Second-price auctions with two-dimensional private information on values and partic-
ipation costs. Working paper, 2009.
X. Cao and G. Tian. Equilibria in first-price auctions with participation costs. Games and Economic Behav-
ior, 69(2):258–273, 2010.
13
David J Cooper and Hanming Fang. Understanding overbidding in second price auctions: An experimental
study*. The Economic Journal, 118(532):1572–1595, 2008.
J. Cox, V. Smith, and J. Walker. Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctions. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 1(1):61–99, 1988.
James C Cox, Vernon L Smith, and James M Walker. Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions:
Comment. The American Economic Review, pages 1392–1412, 1992.
C. Eckel and P. Grossman. Men, women and risk aversion: experimental evidence. Handbook of Experi-
mental Economics Results, 1:1061–1073, 2008.
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans. Optimal auctions revisited. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(2):227–39, 1993.
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans. The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions.
Economics Letters, 70(2):195–202, 2001.
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and E. Katok. Experiments on auction valuation and endogenous entry. Advances
in Applied Microeconomics: A Research Annual, 13:169–193, 2005.
U. Fischbacher. z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics,
10(2):171–178, 2007.
U. Fischbacher and C. Thoni. Excess entry in an experimental winner-take-all market. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 67(1):150–163, 2008.
J. Green and J. Laffont. Participation constraints in the vickrey auction. Economics Letters, 16(1):31–36,
1984.
R. Harstad. Alternative common-value auction procedures: revenue comparisons with free entry. Journal
of Political Economy, pages 421–429, 1990.
B. Heydenreich, R. Mu¨ller, M. Uetz, and R. Vohra. Characterization of revenue equivalence. Econometrica,
77(1):307–316, 2009.
C. Holt and S. Laury. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 92(5):1644–1655,
2002.
R. Ivanova-Stenzel and T. Salmon. Bidder preferences among auction institutions. Economic Inquiry, 42
(2):223–236, 2004.
R. Ivanova-Stenzel and T. Salmon. Revenue equivalence revisited. Games and Economic Behavior, 64(1):
171–192, 2008a.
R. Ivanova-Stenzel and T. Salmon. Robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions. Economic
Inquiry, 46(3):355–368, 2008b.
R. Ivanova-Stenzel and T. Salmon. The high/low divide: self-selection by values in auction choice. Games
and Economic Behavior, 73(1), 2011.
Dominic DP Johnson, Rose McDermott, Emily S Barrett, Jonathan Cowden, Richard Wrangham,
Matthew H McIntyre, and Stephen Peter Rosen. Overconfidence in wargames: experimental evidence
on expectations, aggression, gender and testosterone. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 273(1600):2513–2520, 2006.
14
J. Kagel and D. Levin. Independent private value auctions: bidder behaviour in first-, second-and third-price
auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Economic Journal, 103(419):868–879, 1993.
P. Klemperer. What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1):169–189,
2002.
D. Levin and J. Smith. Equilibrium in auctions with entry. American Economic Review, 84(3):585–599,
1994.
T. Li and X. Zheng. Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procure-
ment auctions. Review of Economic Studies, 76(4):1397–1429, 2009.
J. Lu. Auction design with opportunity cost. Economic Theory, 38(1):73–103, 2009.
R. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions with entry. Economics Letters, 23(4):343–347, 1987.
F. Menezes and P. Monteiro. Auctions with endogenous participation. Review of Economic Design, 5(1):
71–89, 2000.
A. Miralles. Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs. Mathe-
matical Social Sciences, 56(3):448–455, 2008.
D. Moreno and J. Wooders. Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs. RAND Journal of Economics, 42(2):
313–336, 2011.
R.B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund. Do women shy away from competition? do men compete too much?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3):1067–1101, 2007.
T. Palfrey and S. Pevnitskaya. Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: an experimen-
tal study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66(3):731–747, 2008.
S. Pevnitskaya. Endogenous entry in first-price private value auctions: the self-selection effect. Working
paper, 2004.
D. Reiley. Experimental evidence on the endogenous entry of bidders in internet auctions. Experimental
Business Research, pages 103–121, 2005.
J. Smith and D. Levin. Ranking auctions with risk averse bidders. Journal of Economic Theory, 68(2):
549–561, 1996.
J. Smith and D. Levin. Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: an experimental investigation.
International Journal of Game Theory, 30(3):321–350, 2002.
G. Tan and O. Yilankaya. Equilibria in second-price auctions with participation costs. Journal of Economic
Theory, 130(1):205–219, 2006.
L. Ye. Optimal auctions with endogenous entry. The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 4(1):8, 2004.
15
A Derivations of Nash predictions
A.1 First-price auctions
There are n potential bidders of which 2 ≤ m ≤ n have entered the auction. Assume that m is common
knowledge. We restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium in which potential bidders employ an entry
threshold of 0 < vω < vH . Thus, all m bidders have values in excess of this threshold.
We proceed by identifying the symmetric equilibrium bidding function, β. Assume that it is both differ-
entiable and strictly monotonically increasing. The expected payoff of bidder i with value vi ≥ vω who bids
b 6= β (vi)(with b ≥ β (vω), as this would ensure a payoff of zero), assuming that the other m − 1 bidders
bid according to β is given by








(vi − b) . (5)
Taking the partial derivative with respect to b, and setting it equal to zero, and noting that incentive compat-
ibility implies that b = β (vi) in equilibrium we arrive at the following differential equation
(m− 1)
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This can be rewritten as
β (vi) = vi −
∫ vi
vω
(F (t)− F (vω))m−1 dt
(F (vi)− F (vω))m−1
. (9)
Now consider the case in which m = 1. That is there is only one bidder, and this bidder is aware of this.
She will thus submit a bid of zero, and obtain the good.
Plugging the equilibrium bid function into the payoff function shows that the equilibrium payoff of a
bidder with value vi ≥ vω and m > 1 is given by








Note that if m = 1, then the equilibrium payoff of bidder i is simply vi.
We now consider the entry decision of a potential bidder who faces a participation cost of c and hasvi ≥
vω. The expected profit of entry, assuming that all potential bidders employ the entry threshold vω, and bid
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according to β if they enter is














Note that if a potential bidder has vi = vω, then she will enter the auction. She will then obtain the good
at a price of zero, provided she is the only entrant, which occurs with probability F (vω)
n−1. Setting the
associated expected payoff equal to c implicitly defines vω:
vωF (vω)
n−1 = c. (12)













β (t) (F (t)− F (vω))k−1
)
f (t) dt. (13)
Simplifying by integrating by parts leaves us with
RFP = n (n− 1)
∫ vH
vω
(1− F (t)) tF (t)n−2 f (t) dt. (14)
A.2 English Clock auctions
Assume that potential bidders employ a symmetric entry threshold, which we denote as 0 < vθ < vH . Note
that any bidder who enters will always bid her value, regardless of the number of bidders, m. That is, the
bidding function that is consistent with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is ρ (vi) = vi. Thus, we only need to






be the distribution of values, conditional on entry into the auction. Denote
the associated density as g = G′. If a bidder with vi ≥ vθ observes that there are m > 1 bidders in the
auction, then her equilibrium expected payoff is











If we simplify and integrate by parts, this becomes
piECi (ρ (vi) , vi|m) =
∫ vi
vθ
G (t)m−1 dt. (16)
The equilibrium expected payoff of a potential bidder with value vi ≥ vθ is given by













Note the parallel with first-price auctions. Logic identical to the first-price auction shows that vθ is
implicitly defined by
vθF (vθ)
n−1 = c. (18)
Note that the equilibrium entry thresholds are identical in first-price and English clock auctions. Since
this implies that the expected payoffs of potential bidders are also identical, the expected revenue between
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the two formats is also identical. That is, REC = RFP .
B Instructions for first-price sessions
The instructions for first-price sessions, translated from the original Spanish, are below. Instructions for the
English clock sessions are available upon request.
SLIDE NUMBER 1
Introduction
• The following instructions will explain how you can earn money. The amount of money that each
participant earns may vary considerably depending on the decisions the participant makes.
• Participants will interact only through computers. If anyone disobeys the rules, we will terminate the
experiment and will ask you to leave without any earnings.
SLIDE NUMBER 2
Earnings in the experiment
• The amounts in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Pesos (E$).
• Each participant will start the experiment with a balance of E$500. Profits (or losses) are added to (or
subtracted from) the balance.
• At the end of the experiment, we will convert your accumulated balance to Quetzales (Q1 = E$7.5),
and we will pay it in cash.
SLIDE NUMBER 3
Overview
• The experiment will have 40 rounds. In each round, you will participate in an auction of a good or in
a pastime.
• At the beginning of each round you will make a decision regarding whether:
1. you pay the PARTICIPATION FEE, and participate in the auction, or
2. you do not pay anything, and participate in the pastime.
• If you participate in the auction you can make money if you buy the good. If you participate in the
pastime you will not earn (or lose) money.
SLIDE NUMBER 4
Value
• At the beginning of each round each potential buyer will know his value of the auctioned good, but
the potential buyer will not know how much the good is valued by the other potential buyers.
• The VALUE of the good for each potential buyer will be between E$0 and E$100, and it will be
determined randomly. (All the values between 0 and 100 have the same probability of being chosen).
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• The VALUE of each buyer will be independent from the others; the VALUE is not related to (and
probably will be different from) the VALUE of the others.
SLIDE NUMBER 5
• The earnings you can obtain (if you purchase the good in the auction) depend on its VALUE, the
PARTICIPATION FEE, and the Price that is paid for the good. If its VALUE is greater than the Price
you pay + the PARTICIPATION FEE, you will earn the difference.
• VALUE - Price - PARTICIPATION FEE = Profit (or Loss)
• If the Price you pay is greater than the VALUE, you will lose money. If you do not buy it, you will
have to pay the PARTICIPATION FEE.
SLIDE NUMBER 6
PARTICIPATION FEE
• The PARTICIPATION FEE is determined randomly betweenE$1 andE$30 in each round, and it will
be the same for all participants. (All the fees between E$1 and E$30 are equally likely to be chosen).
In each round, all the potential buyers will have:
– The same PARTICIPATION FEE, and
– Probably a different VALUE.
SLIDE NUMBER 7
Participation
• Once you have seen your VALUE, and before you know the PARTICIPATION FEE, you will be asked
which is the MAXIMUM FEE you would be willing to pay in order to participate in the auction.
• The MAXIMUM FEE you enter will not affect the PARTICIPATION FEE, as this is determined
randomly and it is the same for everyone.
SLIDE NUMBER 8
Participation
• If the MAXIMUM FEE that you would be willing to pay is less than the PARTICIPATION FEE you
will NOT participate in the auction (you will participate in the pastime), and you will pay nothing.
• If the MAXIMUM FEE that you would be willing to pay is greater or equal to the PARTICIPATION




• Suppose you have a value of 50 and the MAXIMUM FEE you would be willing to pay in order to
participate is 15.
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• If the PARTICIPATION FEE for that round is 23, you are not willing to pay the PARTICIPATION
FEE. Therefore, you will NOT participate in the auction and you will pay nothing.
• If the PARTICIPATION FEE for that round is 7, you are willing to pay more than the rate. Therefore,
you WILL participate in the auction and you will pay the PARTICIPATION FEE (7).
• Notice that the MAXIMUM FEE that you would be willing to pay (15) does not affect the PARTICI-
PATION FEE you pay to participate (7).
SLIDE NUMBER 10
MAXIMUM FEE
• Note that if you enter a MAXIMUM FEE which is less than what you are actually willing to pay, it is
possible that you may not participate in the auction, even if you would rather preferred to.
• For example, suppose that the maximum that you are actually willing to pay to participate is 15:
• If you indicate a MAXIMUM FEE of 10 and the PARTICIPATION FEE is 12, you do not participate
even if you would have rather preferred to pay 12 and participate. If you would have indicated a
MAXIMUM FEE of 15, you would have participated and paid 12.
SLIDE NUMBER 11
MAXIMUM FEE
• On the other hand, if you indicate as your MAXIMUM FEE an amount higher than the maximum that
you are actually willing to pay, it is possible that you may participate in the auction and pay more than
what you were willing to pay.
• Suppose that the maximum that you are actually willing to pay to participate is 15:
• If you indicate a MAXIMUM FEE of 20 and the PARTICIPATION FEE IS 18, you participate and
pay 18 even though the maximum you were really willing to pay to participate is 15. If you would
have indicated a MAXIMUM FEE of 15, you would have not participated and paid 18.
SLIDE NUMBER 12
MAXIMUM FEE and Participation
• In other words, what you pay to participate in the auction (PARTICIPATION FEE) does not depend
on the maximum amount that you are willing to pay (MAXIMUM FEE).
• Therefore, you should indicate the maximum amount that you are willing to pay as the MAXIMUM
FEE, as this will determine whether you participate or not, but will not determine how much you pay
to participate in the auction.
SLIDE NUMBER 13
Auction
• If you participate in the auction you will make a Price Offer.
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• The person that makes the highest Offer Price will buy the good. (In case of a tie between two or more
offers, the purchaser will be determined randomly). The Price paid by the purchaser will be equal to
his Offer.
• If you are the only participant in the auction, you will buy the good with any offer you make, even
with an offer of 0.
SLIDE NUMBER 14
Earnings in the Auction
• The earnings of the buyer is the difference between the VALUE and the Price, minus the PARTICI-
PATION FEE:
• VALUE - Price - PARTICIPATION FEE = Earnings
• Note that you will make money only if the Price at which you buy the good is lower than (VALUE -
PARTICIPATION FEE).
• Those who do not buy the good pay the PARTICIPATION FEE.
SLIDE NUMBER 15
Auction Example
• Example: Suppose that your value is 76. If your offer is 61 and the offers of the other participants are
37 and 60, you buy the good and pay the Price (61). Your profit in this round would be:
• 76 - 61 - PARTICIPATION FEE
• If your offer is not the highest, you do not buy the good and you pay the PARTICIPATION FEE.
SLIDE NUMBER 16
Not Participating in the Auction
• If you do not participate you will not have earnings or losses, and you will not pay the PARTICIPA-
TION FEE.
• While the auction is being held, you will automatically participate in a pastime:
• Tic-tac-toe
– You will play against the computer and you will win if you can place 3 of the symbols (X) in a
straight line (horizontal, vertical or diagonal).
– Your result in this hobby will not affect your earnings.
SLIDE NUMBER 17
Potential Buyers in the Auction
• In some rounds, there will be 3 (you and 2 other) potential buyers in the auction. In others, there will
be 5 (you and 4 other) potential buyers.




• The experiment will have 40 rounds. In each round, the participants will be randomly reassigned,
according to the number of potential buyers.
• That is, you will NOT be participating with the same people in all rounds.
SLIDE NUMBER 19
Summary
• The experiment consists in a series of rounds. In each round:
1. You should enter the MAXIMUM FEE that you are willing to pay to participate in the auction.
2. The PARTICIPATION FEE, which is randomly selected, will determine whether you participate
or not in the auction:
• You will participate (and pay the PARTICIPATION FEE) if the MAXIMUM FEE is higher or equal
to the PARTICIPATION FEE.




• If you do not participate in the auction, you will not have earnings or losses, and you will not have to
pay the PARTICIPATION FEE.
• If you participate in the auction, you can earn money if you buy the good and your VALUE is higher
than the Price + PARTICIPATION FEE.
• Earnings (if you buy the good) = VALUE - Price -PARTICIPATION FEE.
• If you do not buy the good, you will pay the PARTICIPATION FEE.
C Instructions for the risk elicitation task
This appendix contains the instructions, translated from the original Spanish, for the risk elicitation task.
The decision sheet provided to subjects can be found in Figure 1.
SLIDE NUMBER 1
Welcome. You will be participating in a decision-making experiment. These instructions will explain to
you how you may earn money. If you have any questions during these instructions, please raise your hand
and we will address them in private. As of right now, it is very important not to talk or try to communicate
in any way with the other participants. If you disobey the rules, we will have to end the experiment and ask
you to leave without any payment.
SLIDE NUMBER 2
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Figure 1: Decision sheet used in the risk elicitation task
Your decision sheet shows 10 rows of decisions. Each of them is a selection between two options,
Option A and Option B. Option A represents a fixed payment; unlike Option B, whose payment depends on
the throw of a 10-sided die.
SLIDE NUMBER 3 Now, please look at the first row at the top of the decision sheet. Option A pays
E$28.00. Option B pays E$80.00 if the die lands on the number 1, but if the dice lands in any number
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between 2 and 10 it pays E$0.00. The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table,
the probability of the higher payment for Option B increases. In fact, for row 10, the last one, the option
pays E$80.00 with certainty so that you will have to choose between E$28.00 and E$80.00. Only one of
the 10 rows determines your earnings. You will choose one option for each of the 10 rows and write it in the
right column.
SLIDE NUMBER 4
After you have made all your selections, we will throw the 10-sided die to select the row that will
determine your earnings. (Obviously, each decision row has the same probability of being chosen.)
SLIDE NUMBER 5
If for the decision row that will determine your earnings you chose option A, you will earn E$28.00. If
for that row you chose option B, we will throw the die a second time to determine your earnings. Remember
you have to choose an option for each decision row. Now, please write your name and student ID number
on the decision sheet.
D Bidding behavior
Potential bidders enter more often than predicted and, conditional on entering, their average payoffs are
greater than those predicted by theory (conditional on the number of bidders). This leads one to expect that
bidders are bidding, on average, below the Nash prediction.28 Nash bidding predictions differ by auction
format. In English clock auctions, bidders have a (weakly) dominant strategy to bid their value. In first-
price auctions bidders shade their bids below their value. Given our parameters, the Nash bidding function
in first-price auction is linear in the bidder’s value. The slope of this function, (m − 1)/m, is increasing
in the number of bidders. The intercept, vc/m is decreasing in the number of bidders and increasing in the
cutoff entry value.29
The entry cost has already been incurred at the bidding stage. In an English clock auction, it is a sunk
cost that does not affect the weakly dominant bidding strategy. In a first price auction, it is still a sunk
cost, but in equilibrium, it provides information on the minimum value of entrants. As such, it affects the
minimum bid independent of value.
Bidding behavior relative to Nash predictions is illustrated in Figure 7. Notice that bidding in first-price
auctions is bimodal, one of which represents overbidding, the other of which represents underbidding. For
English clock auctions we see a substantial amount of bidding in accordance with theory, as well as some
underbidding.
To further analyze bidding behavior, we estimate bidding functions for each auction format via GLS and
include random effects to control for individual subject variation, and cluster standard errors at the session
level. The dependent variable is the observed bid.30 To determine the effect of value on bids, we include
vit, which is the value of bidder i in period t. We also include the observed number of bidders (mit and the
realized entry cost (cit) of bidder i in period t. Additionally, we include a dummy variable for group size
(G5it = 1 if group size equals five), and interact this dummy with vit mit and cit. In some specifications we
28This need not be true. Strictly speaking, all that need hold is for the bids that determine prices to be, on average, lower than
Nash predictions.
29Recall that the cutoff value is given by vc = 100 · (ci/100)1/n, so that the intercept is increasing in the realized participation
cost. This is because a higher participation cost implies a higher entry threshold value, which means that in equilibrium any bidder
must have a higher value.
30In English clock auctions we only observe the bid of non-winning bidders. Thus, our analysis of English clock auctions will
restrict attention to non-winning bids.
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also include additional controls. In particular we control for gender (Malei = 1 if participant i is male),
age (Agei), learning over the course of the experiment (ln(t+1)), and a dummy variable which controls for
order effects (GroupOrderi = 1 if participant i began the experiment with a group size of five).
Table 5 reports results for English clock and first-auctions in which there in more than one bidder.31 No-
tice that in English clock auctions, the coefficient on vit is predicted to be one, and all other coefficients are
predicted to be zero. However, while the coefficient on vit is positive and highly significant it is statistically
lower than one in all specifications.32 Thus, bidders in English clock auctions respond positively to value,
but despite it being a weakly dominanted bidding strategy, they bid less than their value. Note that bidders
do seem to be learning, as evidenced by an increase of the coefficient for vit during the second half of the
experiment. However, the coefficient is still less than one. This underbidding is surprising, since bidders
tend to quickly learn to bid their value in English auctions (see e.g. Harstad (1990)). A possible explanation
for this phenomenon is that bidders are falling pray to the sunk-cost fallacy, which is consistent with the
negative and statistically significant coefficient on cit. Note that this coefficient decreases during the second
half, but it is still negative and marginally significant. Bidding relative to a naive model of bidding, in which
a bidders behaves as though his value were vit− cit is illustrated in Figure 8 which contains kernel densities
of bids relative to this model by group size and auction format. Notice that the densities are bimodal, and
that in English clock auctions, one of these modes corresponds with this naive model of bidding.
Also counter to theory, we find that under some specifications bids are increasing in mit when group
size is three, but that this effect is negative for a group size of five. The magnitude of these effects are small
and may reflect (anti-) social preferences.33
For first price auctions, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of value, and a negative and
statistically significant effect of participation cost. Both are relevant variables for Nash bidding. However,
the predicated coefficients depend on the number of bidders. To facilitate the comparison on bidding behav-
ior with Nash predictions we report additional specifications which include νit = vi · (m − 1)/m (i.e. the
slope of the Nash bidding function) in place of vit, and κit = (ci/100)1/n · 100/m (i.e. the intercept of the
Nash bidding function) in place of cit.
Table 6 contain the results of these specifications. We find that the coefficient on νit is not only positive
and significant, but we are unable to reject that it is equal to one in any specification. In the first half of the
experiment, the interaction of νit and groups size is negative and significant, indicating that responsiveness
is less than predicted by theory when group size is five.34 However, if we restrict attention to the second half
of the experiment, the coefficient on νit · G5it is not longer significant: we cannot reject that bids respond
to changes in value as predicted by theory, regardless of group size. Thus, the slope of our estimated bid
functions are in line with theoretical predictions.
The coefficient on κit is positive and statistically significant when we consider all periods, but we reject
the null that it is equal to one. Furthermore, when we restrict attention to the second half of the experiment,
the coefficient is no longer significant. That is, the intercept of the bid function seems to be lower than what
theory predicts. As such, we conclude that deviations of bidding from theory are largely driven by bidders
not accounting for the information that the entry cost conveys regarding the interval of bids from which the
values of other bidders are drawn.
31We restrict attention to auctions with more than one bidder because in first-price auctions with only one bidder they can win
the auction with a bid of zero, and in English clock auctions with one bidder the auction ends automatically at a price of zero.
32The p-values for tests of coefficients are reported below the relevant specification.
33Cooper and Fang (2008) find evidence for spiteful bidding in second price auctions.
34We reject the null that the sum of the coefficients on νit and νit · G5it are equal to one. p-values for these tests are reported
below the relevant specifications.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for WTP by region and treatment
Treatment Willingness to pay Predicted willingness to pay
Region 1 FP 3 4.137 0.250
(7.425) (0.289)
FP 5 5.920 0.160
(8.134) (0.229)
EC 3 3.577 0.250
(6.158) (0.289)
EC 5 5.668 0.160
(7.283) (0.229)
Region 2 FP 3 13.198 9.657
(9.899) (7.795)
FP 5 17.693 9.772
(9.924) (8.348)
EC 3 12.422 9.657
(9.714) (7.795)
EC 5 17.193 9.772
(9.781) (8.348)
Region 3 FP 3 26.203 30.000
(6.503) (0.000)
FP 5 26.614 30.000
(6.171) (0.000)
EC 3 25.578 30.000
(7.031) (0.000)
EC 5 26.164 30.000
(6.397) (0.000)
Notes: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses.
E Additional tables and figures
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Table 2: Random effects tobit estimates of WTP for region two
All 40 periods Last 20 periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PWTPit 0.653*** 0.648*** 0.748*** 0.754***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.058) (0.058)
PWTPit · FPi 0 0 0.058 0.060
(0.045) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066)
FPi 1.028 -3.161 -0.449 -3.847
(1.499) (2.251) (1.771) (2.653)
PWTPit ·G5it 0.022 0.024 -0.055 -0.063
(0.046) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066)
G5it 5.920*** 5.796*** 6.888*** 6.723***
(0.560) (0.561) (0.813) (0.812)










Constant 5.742*** 25.168*** 4.737*** 35.667***
(1.094) (7.067) (1.314) (9.642)
Tests of coefficientsa
PWTPit = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PWTPit + PWTPit · FPi = 1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
FPi + PWTPit · FPi = 0 0.489 0.159 0.823 0.151
PWTPit + PWTPit ·G5it = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Malei · FPi +Malei = 0 0.024 0.083
Malei · FPi + FPi = 0 0.024 0.323
Observations 2,494 2,494 1,292 1,292
Left-censored observations 226 226 147 147
Right-censored observations 441 441 252 252
Log-likelihood -7208.2 -7198.7 -3650.3 -3642.8
Bayesian information criterion 14479.0 14499.0 7357.9 7378.7
Akaike’s information criterion 14432.4 14423.4 7316.6 7311.6
ap-values for each relevant specification are reported in the corresponding column.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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FP3 9.837 5.934 19.953 11.868 0.512 -3.392
(18.544) (13.499) (8.601) (8.140) (17.488) (13.665)
FP5 5.86 2.224 22.907 11.441 -6.022 -9.658
(14.944) (9.828) (7.472) (8.688) (14.777) (10.586)
EC3 10.58 5.732 19.823 12.173 1.328 -3.519
(19.929) (14.395) (8.109) (8.281) (18.977) (14.351)
EC5 6.937 2.928 22.925 11.532 -4.472 -8.481
(18.587) (11.898) (6.901) (8.833) (18.410) (12.179)
Notes: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses. The first two columns contain observed and expected bidder
payoffs in the terminal subgame, ignoring the sunk participation cost. Expected bidder payoffs are calculated based on observed
value and observed number of entrants, assuming risk-neutral Nash bidding.
Table 4: Summary statistics for bidding conditional on observed entry behavior
Treatment Observed bids Predicted bids Predicted bids with sunk cost fallacy
FP3 42.888 47.647 43.168
(18.829) (27.703) (24.797)
FP5 45.762 44.399 39.880
(18.427) (38.234) (34.268)
EC3 45.237 51.785 34.788
(20.623) (23.360) (28.611)
EC5 48.496 58.382 30.082
(21.675) (23.904) (34.455)
Notes: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses. First-price auctions include all
bidders, while English clock auctions include all non-winning bidders.
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Table 5: Random effects estimates of the determinants of bids in auctions with more than one bidder
English clock First-price
All 40 periods Last 20
periods
All 40 periods Last 20
periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
G5it -0.001 0.966 7.848 1.604 1.485 1.207
(3.598) (3.637) (4.124) (1.471) (1.793) (3.136)
vit 0.747*** 0.747*** 0.824*** 0.675*** 0.671*** 0.734***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.033) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
vit ·G5it -0.033 -0.042 -0.142* -0.002 0.000 -0.009
(0.063) (0.061) (0.065) (0.022) (0.022) (0.050)
mit 0.61 1.396*** 2.036*** 0.759 0.327 -0.268
(0.513) (0.247) (0.390) (0.596) (0.269) (0.848)
mit ·G5it -0.159 -1.579*** -3.551*** 0.077 1.534 2.532
(0.364) (0.402) (0.741) (0.182) (1.018) (1.431)
cit -0.353*** -0.218*** -0.184* -0.416*** -0.398*** -0.528***
(0.045) (0.064) (0.094) (0.097) (0.091) (0.128)
cit ·G5it 0.037 -0.133 -0.183 -0.039 0.021 0.012
(0.109) (0.117) (0.244) (0.033) (0.083) (0.108)
ln(t+ 1) 0.753 0.367 2.464** 4.020*
(1.176) (6.049) (0.898) (2.006)
GroupOrderi 7.998*** 16.607** -4.783 -9.111*
(1.641) (5.770) (4.143) (4.594)
Malei 2.53 5.159 -0.104 -0.057
(2.197) (3.281) (1.386) (1.079)
Agei 0.037 -0.547 0.333 0.218
(0.460) (0.686) (0.437) (0.467)
Constant 9.053*** -0.507 2.759 2.388 -10.264 -12.725
(1.466) (12.268) (27.430) (2.035) (10.230) (12.747)
Tests of coefficientsa
vit = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
vit + vit ·G5it = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
mit +mit ·G5it = 0 0.417 0.336 0.047
cit + cit ·G5it = 0 0.000 0.000 0.127
Observations 837 837 407 1,428 1,428 682
Clusters 5 5 5 5 5 5
Overall R2 0.613 0.619 0.611 0.712 0.721 0.789
ap-values for each relevant specification are reported in the corresponding column.
Random effects estimated via generalized least squares.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered to allow for intra-session correlation.
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Random effects estimates of the responsiveness of bids in first-price
auctions to equilibrium predictions
All 40 periods Last 20 periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
νit 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.089*** 1.092***
(0.071) (0.067) (0.084) (0.085)
νit ·G5it -0.148*** -0.139*** -0.145 -0.143
(0.036) (0.032) (0.076) (0.078)
κit 0.178*** 0.225** 0.134 0.178
(0.050) (0.075) (0.081) (0.093)
κit ·G5it 0.220** 0.176* 0.198 0.214
(0.085) (0.082) (0.132) (0.135)
G5it -3.18 -2.205 -3.816 -3.916
(1.998) (1.411) (3.384) (3.119)








Constant 1.903 -14.228 2.858 -26.461
(2.006) (9.420) (1.875) (16.951)
Tests of coefficientsa
νit = 1 0.67 0.657 0.291 0.281
νit + νit ·G5it = 1 0.022 0.028 0.293 0.319
κit = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
κit + κit ·G5it = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1428 1428 682 682
Clusters 5 5 5 5
Overall R2 0.67 0.688 0.729 0.735
ap-values for each relevant specification are reported in the corresponding column.
Random effects estimated via generalized least squares.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered to allow for intra-session correlation.
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Random effects tobit estimates of WTP for region two controlling for
competitiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PWTPit 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.670*** 0.666***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
PWTPit · FPi -0.007 -0.007 -0.014 -0.007
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
FPi -2.655 -3.6 -3.584 -1.064
(2.623) (2.657) (2.665) (3.723)
PWTPit ·G5it 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.031
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
G5it 5.956*** 5.957*** 3.909*** 5.951***
(0.620) (0.620) (0.895) (0.620)
ln(t+ 1) -0.193 -0.196 -0.17 -0.196
(0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269)
GroupOrderi -0.26 -0.376 -0.347 -0.405
(1.642) (1.624) (1.630) (1.618)
Malei -1.864 -2.426 -2.443 -2.867
(2.350) (2.348) (2.356) (2.382)
FPi ·Malei 6.527* 7.567* 7.623* 7.746*
(3.337) (3.346) (3.357) (3.337)
Agei -0.925* -0.929* -0.933* -0.863*





FPi · Compi 0.02
(0.038)
ECi · Compi 0.074+
-0.041
Constant 26.436** 24.858** 25.742** 22.461*
-8.975 -8.915 -8.948 -9.214
Tests of coefficientsa
Compi + Compi ·G5it = 0 0.016
Compi · FPi = Compi · ECi 0.333
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076
Left-censored observations 195 195 195 195
Right-censored observations 387 387 387 387
Log-likelihood -5,912.3 -5,911.0 -5,906.0 -5,910.6
Bayesian information criterion 11,924.0 11,929.0 11,926.7 11,935.7
Akaike’s information criterion 11,850.7 11,850.1 11,842.1 11,851.1
ap-values for each relevant specification are reported in the corresponding column.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Random effects tobit estimates of WTP for region two controlling for risk pref-
erences
(1) (2) (3)
PWTPit 0.657*** 0.656*** 0.656***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
PWTPit · FPi -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
FPi -3.396 -3.833+ -3.375
(2.366) (2.308) (5.267)
PWTPit ·G5it 0.02 0.019 0.019
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
G5it 5.793*** 5.794*** 5.794***
(0.590) (0.590) (0.590)
ln(t+ 1) -0.711** -0.708** -0.708**
(0.258) (0.258) (0.258)
GroupOrderi -1.309 -0.632 -0.61
(1.463) (1.442) (1.460)
Malei -2.523 -3.157 -3.12
(2.031) (1.988) (2.023)
FPi ·Malei 6.386* 6.869* 6.828*
(2.944) (2.868) (2.899)




FPi · SafeChoicesi -1.474*
(0.635)
ECi · SafeChoicesi -1.374+
(0.812)
Constant 25.956*** 32.249*** 31.997***
(7.016) (7.192) (7.649)
Tests of coefficientsa
SafeChoicesi · FPi = SafeChoicesi · ECi 0.923
Observations 2,237 2,237 2,237
Left-censored observations 205 205 205
Right-censored observations 385 385 385
Log-likelihood -6,487.0 -6,482.9 -6,482.9
Bayesian information criterion 13,074.2 13,073.8 13,081.5
Akaike’s information criterion 13,000.0 12,993.8 12,995.8
ap-values for each relevant specification are reported in the corresponding column.
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 8: Kernel densities of bid deviations from naive predictions by auction format and number of potential
bidders.
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Table 9: Random effects tobit estimates of WTP for all regions
All 40 periods Last 20 periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PWTPit 0.920*** 0.919*** 0.951*** 0.952***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028)
PWTPit · FPi 0.029 0.03 0.123*** 0.124***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033)
FPi 0.88 -3.126+ -0.685 -4.422+
(1.225) (1.856) (1.487) (2.262)
PWTPit ·G5it 0.006 0.006 0.051 0.051
(0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.034)
G5it 3.030*** 3.017*** 3.010*** 2.848***
(0.380) (0.381) (0.547) (0.549)










Constant 2.706** 12.893* 2.113+ 24.303**
(0.895) (5.810) (1.101) (7.907)
Tests of coefficientsa
PWTPit = 1 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.090
PWTPit + PWTPit · FPi = 1 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.011
FPi + PWTPit · FPi = 0 0.457 0.095 0.704 0.057
PWTPit + PWTPit ·G5it = 1 0.000 0.000 0.941 0.922
Constant = 0 0.003 0.026 0.055 0.002
Malei · FPi +Malei = 0 0.001 0.006
Malei · FPi + FPi = 0 0.019 0.317
Observations 6000 6000 3000 3000
Left-censored observations 785 785 462 462
Right-censored observations 1580 1580 840 840
Log-likelihood -15289.535 -15282.154 -7274.929 -7265.914
Bayesian information criterion 30648.666 30677.401 14613.909 14635.912
Akaike’s information criterion 30595.07 30590.308 14565.858 14557.829
ap-values for each relevant specification are reported in the corresponding column.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Region 1 FP3 -1.976 -1.095 17.333 0.294 -12.048 -11.167
(13.459) (4.705) (11.682) (0.310) (16.171) (11.446)
FP5 0.198 -0.008 16.659 0.258 -8.016 -8.222
(5.946) (2.813) (10.242) (0.263) (8.768) (7.297)
EC3 0.590 -0.077 14.692 0.275 -7.282 -7.949
(2.971) (1.085) (9.423) (0.282) (6.920) (7.130)
EC5 0.420 0.319 15.294 0.284 -7.731 -7.832
(4.979) (2.574) (8.686) (0.265) (7.039) (6.027)
Region 2 FP3 9.837 5.934 19.953 11.868 0.512 -3.392
(18.544) (13.499) (8.601) (8.140) (17.488) (13.665)
FP5 5.86 2.224 22.907 11.441 -6.022 -9.658
(14.944) (9.828) (7.472) (8.688) (14.777) (10.586)
EC3 10.58 5.732 19.823 12.173 1.328 -3.519
(19.929) (14.395) (8.109) (8.281) (18.977) (14.351)
EC5 6.937 2.928 22.925 11.532 -4.472 -8.481
(18.587) (11.898) (6.901) (8.833) (18.410) (12.179)
Region 3 FP3 32.498 23.644 27.737 30.000 19.033 10.179
(32.231) (25.852) (4.240) (0.000) (30.849) (25.699)
FP5 21.188 9.663 27.964 30.000 6.855 -4.669
(25.297) (18.523) (4.212) (0.000) (24.061) (18.525)
EC3 38.430 16.731 27.581 30.000 24.964 3.265
(33.841) (29.668) (4.279) (0.000) (33.429) (28.601)
EC5 24.366 8.042 27.660 30.000 9.755 -6.569
(30.146) (21.917) (4.210) (0.000) (28.602) (20.620)
Notes: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses. The first two columns contain observed and expected bidder
payoffs in the terminal subgame, ignoring the sunk participation cost. Expected bidder payoffs are calculated based on observed
value and observed number of entrants, asuming risk-neutral Nash bidding.
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